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STATE OF UTAH 
J. R. WALKER, 
Plaintiff and Res1pondent, 
vs. 
TRACY LOAN & TRUST COM-
Case No. 
5338 
P ANY, a corporation as receiver BRIEF OF 
for WALKER BROTHERS DRY RESPONDENT 
GOODS COMPANY, a corporation, 
Al>s. Trano. 
Defendant and Appellant. 
The Lower Court, prior to the institution of 
this action, required the appellant to set aside 
a fund of $11,268.33 out of which certain claims 
against the appellant could be paid in full, in 
case they were finally adjudged preferred claims. 
Respondent's claim of $2,909.85 went to make up 
the totaJ of $11,268.33. By the judgment of the 
Lower 1Court in this action, the appellant was 
ordered to pay to the respondent his claim in 
full out of said sum. The findings of fact upon 
which this judgment is founded are in substantial 
Aba. Trans. 
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accord with the allegations of plaintiff's com-
plaint. There is ample evidence in the record, as 
will be shown hereafter, to support these find-
ings; in fact, the evidence supporting the find-
ings and in turn the allegations of plaintiff's 
complaint are uncontradicted. 
An examination of the Assignments of Error 
indicates but a single question to be determined 
upon this appea.il, namely, Is the claim of re-
spondent a preferred claim, or does he stand 
with reference to said claim as a common cred-
itor~ At the outset it is respectfully submitted 
that if plaintiff's complaint states a cause of 
action for a preference then this appeal should 
fail and the judgment of the Lower Court should 
be sustained. The sufficiency of the complaint 
has never been attacked. There are no affirma-
tive allegations in defendant's answer. The first 
five paragraphs of the complaint are admitted by 
the answer. Paragraph six reads as follows: 
"6. That prior to the appointment of 
the defendant as receiver of Walker 
Brothers Dry Goods Company, as afore-
said, the plaintiff de<livered to and depos-
Abo. Trans. 
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ited with the said Walker Brothers Dry 
Goods Company the sum of $2,909.85, to 
be retained and held by the said Walker 
Brothers Dry Goods Company for the sole 
and specific and special purpose, and that 
only, of securing the payment and of pay-
ing for the future goods, wares and mer-
chandise to be purchased by the wife of 
plaintiff from Walker Brothers Dry 
Goods store; that the said deposit so made 
by plaintiff to Walker Brothers Dry 
Goods Company, as aforesaid, was ac-
cepted and held by vV alker Brothers Dry 
Goods store as a special fund or deposit 
in trust for the specific use and purpose 
for which it was delivered, received, ac-
cepted and held, to-wit: the satisfaction 
and payment of future advances and sales 
of goods, wares and merchandise by 
\Valker Brothers Dry Goods store to the 
wife of pJaintiff, as aforesaid, and not 
otherwise.'' 
In its answer appellant admits the indebtedness 
of $2,909.85 but denies the other allegations in 




en of plaintiff's complaint are admitted m de-
fendant's ansv,'er, m1d paragraphs nine, twelve 
and thirteen denied. We need only to examine-
into the e·vidence to ascertain whether or not 
the allegations of paragraph six are sustained. 
If so, the allegations of paragraphs nine, twelve 
and thirteen are necessarily true. 
EVIDENCE 
Amy B. Chase was the first witness called. 
On her direct examination she testified: 
"A. At this time Mr. ·walker asked 
me to transfer the account of Alice Young 
Frye from her savings account to pay the 
account of Mrs. J. R. vValker and it left 
a balance of two thousand dollars, some-
where around that. He said Mrs. \Valker 
would be charging more merchandise and 
we would use that to pay the account, use 
this two thousand to pay the account 
when her account was that amount. 
"Q. As I understand it this Frye ac-
count was applied first to the payment 
of the indebtedness then owmg the com-
pany by Mrs. \¥ alker. 
''A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. That was some three odd thou-
sand dollars~ 
''A. Yes, sir. 
'' Q. And that left a balance? 
''A. Left a balance of somewhere 
around two thousand dollars. 
"Q. It was with reference to that 
balance Mr. Walker told you to hold it 
and apply it on future purchases of Mrs. 
Walker, was iU 
''A. Yes, sir. 
It will be seen from the testimony of Mr. 
J. R. ·walker, the next witness, that in having 
the account of Alice Young Frye transferred to 
himself it was the same as though he had de-
livered to the appellant an equal amount of 
cash for the purpose specified. The history, 
therefore, of the Alice Young Frye account be-
comes unimportant and absolutely immaterial. 
Abe. Trana. 
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By its pleadings appellant has admitted the ex-
istence of the account standing in the name of 
25 31 respondent. Mr. Walker says that he put the 
account there; that he was trustee for her, and 
34 37 held the fund in trust for her. Finally Mr. 
Walker's testimony is as follows: 
'' Q. Now, I will ask you to state 
whether or not this account of Mrs. 
Young's or Miss Frye's was transferred 
to youf 
''A. I had for years ,and years back, 
she was our old nurse girl, and I had the 
handling of this fund, had it long before 
I put it in the store. I put it in there, I 
was trustee, and in my last year I had 
Mrs. Chase transfer it to my account. I 
didn't want to involve her in any receiver-
ship proceedings. I was taking care of 
this fund for her. I told Mrs. Chase to 
transfer it to my account and apply 
enough to clean up Mrs. Walker's account 
and I would leave the balance there for 
her account. She was in the habit of run-
ning an account of two or three thousand 
Abs. Trans. 
7 
dollars a year. I could have drawn it out 
if I wanted to. 
'' Q. Mrs. Chase told you at that time 
she did do that~ 
''A. Yes, she did that. 
'' Q. You left it there upon the re-
liance of that statement~ 
''A. Left it there expecting it to be 
paid on my wife's future purchases. 
'' Q. That is the way you want to ap-
ply it now? 
"A. Yes, sir." 
The appellant offered no evidence. By stip-
ulation all of the evidence introduced in the case 
of C. G. Renshaw against this appeHant was con-
f:-\idered as evidence in this case. The bill of ex-
ceptions settled in said action was also incorpo-
rated in and became part of the record in this 
case on appeal. In the Renshaw case Mrs. 
Chase was the first witness, and testified con-
cerning deposits made by Mr. Renshaw and Miss 
Salisbury with \V,alker Brothers Dry Goods 
8 
Abs. Trans. 
48 Company. (Renshaw Transcript 34.) She ex-
plained the nature of the special accounts of 
Renshaw and Salisbury; how they were entered 
upon the books of the company, and how special 
time deposits were maintained in the company's 
banks more than sufficient to pay all of the de-
posits made by employees similar to the deposits 
of Renshaw, Salisbury and Alice Frye. She also 
testified on cross examination concerning certain 
changes that had been made when Mr. Dreyfous 
purchased the business and before the receiver 
was appointed. It is submitted there is nothing 
in the testimony of Mrs. Chase in the Renshaw 
case which in any wise detracts from her testi-
mony in the case at bar or from the testimony 
of Mr. Walker. The only bearing it could pos-
sibly have would be to show the nature of the 
account of Alice Frye prior to the transfer there-
of to the respondent herein. If the respondent 
is correct in his assumption that what happened 
prior to the transfer of this account to J. R. 
Walker is immaterial, then the entire testi-
mony in the Renshaw case is likewise immaterial. 
75 In the Renshaw bill of exceptions the following 
appears: (Renshaw Trans. 61.) 
Abs. Trani. 
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"MR. MOYLE: The record may show 
that we withdraw in open court, and with 
the consent of counsel on the opposite 
side, the right of setoff heretofore claimed 
in our pleadings, without in any wise af-
fecting our claim to the right of prefer-
ence for the fu1l amount.'' 
Judgment was entered for the respondent, 
therefore, for the full amount of his claim and 
the setoff as prayed for was not allowed. 
ARGUMENT 
\VHEN rrHE PLAINTIFF, RESPONDENT 
HEREIN, THEREFORE, DEPOSITED WITH 
\V ALKER BROTHERS DRY GOODS COM-
pANY SOME FIVE OR SIX THOUSAND DOL-
LARS, WFrH THE REQUEST THAT IT BE 
USED F'IRST TO PAY HIS WIFE'S AC-
COUNT TO DA 'rE AND THEREAFTER THE 
BALANCE TO BE PAID UPON HIS WIFE'S 
FUTURE PURCHASES, \VAS A TRUST CRE-
ATED? 
$2,909.85 is admitted to be the balance left 
with \Valker Brothers Dry Goods Company to pay 
for respondent's wife's future purchases. Mr. 
Aba. Tran1. 
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Walker states that Mrs. Chase, cashier, book-
keeper and control accountant, told him that she 
would do that, and that she did do it, and that he 
left the sum of $2,909.85 with Walker Brothers 
Dry Goods Company in reliance upon its agree-
ment to use the same to pay his wife's future pur-
chases; that that was the way he wanted to have 
it applied. The allegations of the complaint con-
form to the evidence in alleging that the sum of 
$2,909.85 was to be retained and held for the sole 
and specific and special purpose, and that only, 
of securing the payment and of paying for the 
future goods, wares and merchandise to be pur-
chased by the wife of plaintiff; that said deposit 
was accepted and held by the store as a special 
fund or deposit for the specific use and purpose 
for which it was delivered, received, accepted and 
held. 
It is admitted that upon the appointment of 
the receiver there came into his hands sums of 
money in excess of the amount of plaintiff's claim. 
In leaving· the sum of $2,909.85 with Walker 
Brothers Dry Goods Company to pay for future 
purchases of respondent's wife, the funds of that 
company were clearly augmented to the amount 
Aba. Trans. 
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of said deposit. This deposit took place in May 
of 1930, and the receiver was appointed in the fol-
lowing June. It, therefore, necessarily follows 
that if a trust was created by said deposit the 
general creditors of Walker Brothers Dry Goods 
Company are not entitled to participate in the 
$2,909.85 deposited by respondent which in turn 
augmented the assets of Walker Brothers Dry 
Goods Company, and pa.rticularly the cash on 
hand. The legal presumption is that the money 
which came into the hands of the receiver con-
tains the trust funds held by the insolvent, that 
is to say, the insolvent spent its own funds first. 
·whether or not the presumption is rebuttable, 
the respondent sustained the burden of proof re-
quired of him when he showed that the money 
actually came into the hands of Walker Brothers 
Dry Goods Company, and that there was cash on 
hand the day the receiver took charge in an 
amount equal to or greater than the balance of 
the trust funds in question. Inasmuch as the ap-
pellant did not offer any evidence ·to rebut this 
presumption, it would make no difference in the 
case at bar whether we consider the presumption 
as rebuttable or not. The respondent is entitled 
.A.bs. Trans. 
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to full payment as a preferred creditor, in accord-
ance with the decisions hereinafter set forth. 
A TRUST WAS CREATED 
Even the cases cited and relied upon by ap-
pellant recognize the principle upon which re-
spondent's claim is predicated. In the case of 
Northern Sugar Corporation vs. Thompson, 13 
Fed. (2d) 829, where a general deposit of funds 
had been made to meet the beet pay roll, the 
Court says, at 831: 
"Whether a deposit in a bank is gen-
eral or special depends upon the contract 
resulting from the mutual understanding 
and intention of the parties at the time 
such deposit is made.'' 
And again: 
"Where the depositor, at the time a 
deposit is made, enters into an under-
standing and agreement with the bank 
that the money deposited is for a specific 
purpose, and for that alone, as funds de-
posited to pay a particular note, draft or 
check, such deposit partakes of the nature 
Abo. Trans. 
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of a special deposit, the relation between 
the depositor and the bank is that of prin-
cipal and agent, and the title to the de-
posit remains in the depositor.'' 
This principle applied to the facts in the case at 
bar clearly illustrates the right of the respond-
ent and the right of Walker Brothers Dry Goods 
Company to give and accept the deposit made 
by Mr. Walker for a special purpose, to-wit: the 
payment of his wife's purchases. The distinction 
between the facts of this case and the case at 
bar is clear,ly shown by the following quotation 
from the opinion of the court, quoting a portion 
of the testimony given upon the trial : 
''I expected the 'beet pay ron' checks, 
when presented, would be paid promptly, 
the same as any check that I might issue 
against a bank in which I had an account. 
The balance in the 'beet pay roll' account 
shifted from day to day.'' 
It certainly was proper for this court to hold, in 
the light of that evidence, that the deposit of the 
Sugar Company was general. There is, however, 
no analogy between the facts of that case and 
Abs. Trans. 
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the transaction of the respondent with iW alker 
Brothers Dry Goods Company. 
The next case cited of Noyes vs. First Nat. 
Bank, 167 N. Y. S. 288, involves another general 
deposit in a bank upon which checks were drawn 
to pay interest on interest coupons. The court 
clearly holds that these funds were paid out of 
the bank on the check of the company, the same 
as any other general deposit. 
The case of Holland Trust Company v. 
Sutherland, 69 N. E. 647, is specifical,ly referred 
to in this opinion. In that case the Court of 
Appeals of New York says: 
"The effect of that transaction was to 
make the plaintiff trust company a trustee 
for the coupon holders whose claims were 
to be paid out of the fund so deposited. 
Before the coupons were due, a creditor 
of the Delaware Water Company levied 
an attachment on said moneys .as the 
property of a nonresident defendant. The 
legal effect of that special deposit not 
only created the plaintiff trust company 
a trustee for the coupon holders, but it 
Abs. Trani. 
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changed the title to said moneys from the 
water company to the trust company, in 
whose possession it constituted a trust 
fund for the benefit of coupon holders as 
cestuis que trustent. The trust company 
,adopts this view of the law, and in its 
complaint expressed its desire to pay 
these coupon holders the moneys in ques-
tion, and asks a court of equity for in-
struction in the premises, based on special 
reasons.'' 
In the case of Fralick v. Coeur D'Alene 
Bank & Trust Company, 210 P.ac. 586, the Idaho 
court recognizes the right of a bank to make 
special deposits. This court clearly holds that 
the question turns on whether the deposit is a 
general or special deposit, and that if the latter, 
it is a preferred claim. The evidence in this 
case as detailed in the opinion of the court shows 
a case of a general deposit, but the court 
says: 
"If ,a bank accepts a deposit from A, 
under an agreement to pay it to B, the 
contr:act is one for the benefit of B. It 
has been held that such a contract creates 
Abs. Trans. 
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a trust relationship m favor of B., and 
that in ease of insolvency of the bank the 
trust relationship win be recognized, and 
B. is entitled to recover the trust fund, if 
it can be traced into the assets of the 
bank. \Voodhouse v. Crandall, 197 Ill. 104, 
64 N. E. 292, 58 L. R. A. 385. \V e think this 
rule is correct, if B. did not consent that 
the deposit ,should be considered as one 
for his credit. The evidence in this case, 
as we construe it, fails to show a contract 
which gave the holders of the coupons any 
right of action against the bank.'' 
In Tucker v. Linn et al. (N. J.), 57 Atl. 
1017, relied on by appellant, it is said: 
"The charge is that particular money 
was paid over by the complainant to the 
defendant's intestate to be invested in se-
curities, and these securities were to be 
held by the defendant's intestate. No 
equitable title to the money passes in such 
a case. No equitable title to the securities 
in any way exists in the holder. If this 
bin had been proved to be true, then John 
Linn received money which he had no 
Abs. Trans. 
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right to appropriate to his own use. He 
did not, by receiving the money, become a 
debtor to the complainant. He was 
charged with the duty of expending these 
moneys for securities or investing them 
in securities, and when he did so the 
equitable title to those securities would 
be in the complainant, and he would be 
the mere trustee, not having any bene-
ficial ownership.'' 
The case of Fidelity Savings & Loan Asso-
ciation v. Rodgers et al. (Cal.), 182 Pac. 426, 
can have no bearing on the present controversy. 
The Court in this case says: 
''The expressions used, however, show 
that it was regarded and treated by her 
as an 'account' in her favor against the 
plaintiff, to be paid out by it on her or-
der, and as both parties have discussed 
the case solely upon the theory that it 
was a general deposit for exchange or 
credit, we will assume that such was its 
character." 
The case of Bledsoe v. Hammons, 36 Ariz. 
489, 287 Pac. 297, relied on by appellant on page 
Abs. Trans. 
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31 of its brief, involves a bank account of a 
fraternal order. The name in which this bank 
account stood was changed from the individual 
name of the treasurer to the name of the or-
ganization for which he held it. This change 
was made just prior to the appointment of a 
receiver. It involves nothing more than a change 
in the name under which the deposit was held. 
The deposit was a general deposit, subject to 
checking account both before and after this 
change. It is in no wise enlightening, therefore, 
so far as the present controversy is concerned. 
We turn now to the authorities relied on by 
respondent. 
Michie on Banks and Banking, Vol. 
III, Ch. 6, Sec. 186, p. 259. 
"It is a well established rule that 
moneys received by a bank to be applied 
to a particular purpose or to be remitted 
to some creditor of the person paymg 
such sums, are regarded as trust funds, 
and a claim therefore is ordinarily en-
titled to preference over the claims of 
general creditors in the distribution of the 
Abs. Trans. 
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assets of the insolvent bank. Thus money 
intrusted to a bank for investment is a 
trust fund. And, where money is deposit-
ed with a bank, to be applied in the pay-
ment of a note or other obligation on 
which the depositor is liable, the bank 
holds it as a trust fund and not as the 
assets of the bank and it may be followed 
and reclaimed from the assignee or re-
ceiver. The reason of the rule is that the 
re,lation between the depositor and the 
bank as to such deposits is that of prin-
cipal and agent, or trustee and cestui que 
trust and not simply that of depositor 
and depositary." 
3 R. C. L. 146. 
''The law prescribes no particular for-
mula for the contract involved in making 
a special deposit. Like all contracts, it 
grows out of the mutual intention and un-
derstanding of the parties. The purpose 
and terms of the deposit may be explicit-
ly stated, or the intention of the parties 
may be inferred from their declarations, 
Abs. Trans. 
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considered in connection with their con-
duct and all of the circumstances.'' 
Mothersead v. Harrington, Okla. 250 
Pac. 483. 
In this action the plaintiff paid into the 
defendant bank the sum of $709.65 which was 
heJd by said bank to be paid as the balance due 
on :a contract for the sale of an oil and gas 
lease, upon the seller, a minor, becoming of age. 
In the meantime the Bank passed into the hands 
of a receiver. This case not only holds that this 
sum was held in trust, being a special rather 
than a general duposit, entitling plaintiff to a 
preferenee, but furthermore holds that the com-
mingling of this money with other moneys of 
the Bank did not in any wise prevent the plain-
tiff from reclaiming it as a preferred claim. The 
court quotes with approva'l from the case of Se-
crest v. Ladd, 112 Kan. 23, 209 Pac. 8~4, as fol-
lows: 
''·where a special deposit is placed in 
a bank to be used only in payment of cer-
tain shares of capital stock of the bank 
when the same should be duly authorized 
Abo. 'frano. 
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and issued, which stock was not author-
ized nor issued, but the bank misapprop-
riated the money so deposited and used 
the same in its general business, thereby 
augmenting its assets, and where shortly 
afterwards the bank became insolvent and 
its assets passed into the hands of a re-
ceiver, the special deposit constitutes a 
trust fund which the beneficiwl owner was 
entitled to follow and reclaim from the 
augmented assets in the hands of the re-
ceiver in preference to the claims of gen-
eral creditors.'' 
It likewise quotes from 31 A. L. R. at page 472 
the following general rule : 
''It may be stated as a general rule 
that where a deposit is made in a bank 
with the distinct understanding that it is 
to be held by the bank for the purpose of 
furthering a transaction bPtween the de-
positor and a third person, or where it is 
made under such circumstances as give 
rise to a necessary implication that it is 
made for such a purpose, the deposit be-
comes impressed with a trust which en-
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titles the depositor to a preference over 
the general creditors of the bank where 
it becomes insolvent while holding the 
deposit." 
This case of Secrest v. Ladd, 112 Kan. 23, 
209 Pac. 824, cited with approval in the Mother-
sead case, deserves more than passing comment. 
The facts are so nearly analogous to those in the 
case at bar that there is little, if anything, to 
distinguish the two cases. The Kansas case deals 
with a deposit made by Secrest sixty days before 
the insolvency of the bank for the purpose of 
paying for thirty-one shares of the bank's o>vn 
stock when the same was authorized and issued 
to Secrest. The depo-sit was made and accepted 
for this special purpose. The increase of stock 
had not been authorized nor had any stock been 
issued to Secrest when the bank became insolv-
ent. There were some two hundred thousand dol-
lars remaining upon the closing of the bank and 
about ninety thousand dollars in claimed prefer-
ences. In the case at bar we have a total of 
$11,268.33 in 'preferred claims for which the 
Court has had that much cash in the hands of 
the receiver set aside with which to pay such of 
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the preferred claims as are final,ly adjudged 
preferences. It is further shown that general 
creditors will receive approximately 55o/o of their 
claims. The two cases thus far are entirely an-
alogous. $2,806.73 of the $3,875.00 deposit in the 
Kansas case was made up by the transfer of 
certificates of deposit on other banks. $1,068.47 
was a check or receipt transferring to the bank 
a savings deposit of $1,068.47 which Secrest had 
in that bank. The trial court allowed a preference 
so far as the $2,806.73 was concerned, but denied 
a preference as to the $1,068.47 which was merely 
transferred from the savings account to the bank 
to be held for this special purpose. Each party 
appealed, the receiver for the bank because of 
the preference allowed on the $2,806.73, and Se-
crest because he had been denied a preference 
on the $1 ,068.47. The Supreme ~Court reversed 
the ~ower court so far as the $1,068.47 was con-
cerned, and allowed Secrest a preference for the 
entire amount. Therefore, so far as the $1,068.47 
is concerned, the two cases are still analogous. 
The Kansas Court in its opinion sayR: 
"Was the special deposit made by the 
plaintiff in the bank a trust fund, and, if 
it has the trust character, can it be fol-
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lowed and payment required out of the 
assets of the bank in preference and be-
fore distribution to general creditors?'' 
This is the identical question presented m the 
case at bar. The ,Court goes on to say: 
"There can be no doubt of the fiduci-
ary relation br:>tween the plaintiff and the 
hank. The fund was placed in the bank 
to be applied to a specified purpose for 
the benefit of plaintiff.'' 
Herein lies the only difference between the Kan-
sas case and the case at bar. In the case at bar 
the fund was placed in the hands of appellant to 
be applied to a specific purpose, to-wit: the bene-
fit of a third party. This difference strengthens 
respondent's contention. It might, under some 
circumstances, be possible to say that a fund 
deposited for the benefit of a depositor himself 
did not constitute a trust, but it is difficult to 
conceive of the circumstances under which such 
a deposit made for the benefit of a third person 
could be held otherwise than in trust. This is 
the case at bar. The court says further: 
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"It was intrusted to the bank to be 
applied in payment of the shares of capi-
tal stock when the same was authorized 
and issued. The increase of stock was 
never authorized, and no shares were is-
sued or delivered to plaintiff before the 
failure of the bank. It is agreed that the 
fund was to be for no other than the spe-
cified purpose. The beneficial ownership 
of the fund remained in the plaintiff, and 
the misapplication .of it by the bank did 
not change its trust character.'' 
The second question as to whether or not 
the funds could be traced is likewise answered 
by this court in its opinion: 
''Can it be identified or traced to the 
assets of the insolvent bank which came 
into the possession of the receiver? He 
holds it by no better title than did the 
trustee, and he took the assets of the in-
solvent bank subject to any trust im-
pressed upon them. Instead of holding the 
fund for the specific purpose and applica-
tion, the bank converted and mingled it 
with its general funds using it to honor 
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checks, make loans, and as a part of its 
cash and sight exchange. The special de-
posit was made about two months before 
the bank was closed for insolvency and 
possession of its assets was taken by the 
bank commissioner. If the trust fund can 
be identified, it may be followed through 
every mutation and subjected to the trust. 
The fact that it was mingled with the gen-
eral deposits and used in the general 
business of the bank did not take away 
its trust character nor prevent the owner 
from reclaiming it if it can be traced into 
existing assets in the hands of the re-
ceiver." 
The Court further says : 
"The theory was that, as the fund 
never belonged to the bank, creditors were 
not injured if it was turned over by the 
assignee to its owner." 
Finally the Court says : 
"Here the funds were augmented and 
bettered to the extent of the amount of 
the fund misappropriated and used in th~ 
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business of the bank. The assets which 
came into the hands of the receiver great-
ly exceeded the amount of the trust fund 
in question and in fact of all the trust 
funds claimed. The right to follow and 
retake the proceeds of trust property 
ceases only when assets into which the 
fund has come have been expended so 
that no part of them can be traced to ex-
isting assets. 
''No reason is seen for disallowin~· a 
preference for the amount drawn out of 
the savings account by plaintiff and turned 
over to the bank as part of the special de-
posit. It was as effectually impres~ed 
with the trust as if plaintiff had drawn the 
cash from the bank and placed it with 
other moneys in the fund to be used for 
the specified purpose.'' 
citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company v. 
Bank, 109 Kan. 772, 204 Pac. 992. 
It is submitted therefore, that the rules laid 
down in the opinion in Secrest v. Ladd are very 
peruasive, and, respondent believes, controlling 
Abs. Tran". 
28 
m the case at bar, because of the adoption of 
these same rules by this court in its prior de-
ClSIOns. 
In the case of Jones v. Commercial Invest-
ment Trust Corporation, Uta:h, 228 Pac. 896, this 
court gave in effect, to the purchaser of an au-
tomobile a preference of $1500.00 over general 
creditors of an automobile sales agency then in 
the hands of a receiver. Respondent sees little 
difference between the facts in the Jones case 
and in the case at bar. Jones delivered to Naylor-
Woodruff ~Company an automobile to be sold by 
them for $1,500.00, the sale price, when collected, 
to be applied toward payment for a new auto-
mobile. The $1,500.00 was obtained before the 
receiver was appointed but no automobile was 
delivered. Jones did not seek to obtain a return 
of the $1,500.00. He sought possession of the 
automobile he desired to purchase or had agreed 
to purchase. To give him this automobile the 
court had to find him to be a preferred creditor. 
Had Jones sued to recover $1,500.00 as a pre-
ferred creditor rather than to sue for the au-
tomobile the case would have been identical with 
the case at bar. He would have recovered the 
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$1,500.00. A careful reading of the opmwn of 
this court in that case leaves no doubt as to 
Jones' right to recover the $1,500.00, had he sued 
therefor mther than for the automobile. No 
matter in what light the Jones case is examined, 
we must necessarily come to the conclusion that 
the deposit of that $1,500.00 to be applied on the 
payment of the purchase price when received 
from the sale of the old automobile was a spe-
cial deposit he.Jd by Naylor-\Voodruff Company 
in trust for one purpose only, the purchase of a 
new automobile. The facts are no different in 
the case at bar. Mr. ·walker had transferred into 
his own right the account of Alice Frye. He had 
V\T alker Brothers Dry Goods Company immedi-
ately apply the major portion thereof to the 
payment of an existing indebtedness incurred by 
his wife and he entered into an agreement with 
·walker Brothers then and there that the bal-
ance of said fund should be held by Walker 
Brothers Dry Goods Company for the sole pur-
pose of paying for the future purchases of Mrs. 
Walker. It is difficult to see how any deposit of 
money could be made for a more specific, defin-
ite purpose, or on the other hand, how the con-
clusion can be escaped that a trust was then and 
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there created entitling Mr. Walker to his right 
of preference as given him by the decree of the 
lower court, when vV alker Brothers became m-
solvent and unable to carry out the trust. 
Again, in the case of Gay v. Young Men's 
Cons. Cooperative Mere. Institution, 37 Ut. 280, 
this court recognizes the creation of a trust. The 
trust consisted of the receipt of the purchase 
price of a piece of land, said purchase price to 
be held, first, to secure the debt due from re-
spondent's husband to the parties receiving the 
purchase price, and, second, the whole balance 
of the funds to be held in trust for the wife. The 
court, in recognizing the creation of a trust, says: 
''In view of the findings, it must be 
conclusively assumed that the parcel of 
land conveyed to the appellant corpora-
tion was by it accepted in trust to be sold 
for the 'best price that could be obtained' 
therefor, but, in no event, for less than 
1$300; that when sold so much of the pro-
ceeds as was necessary to discharge the 
debts of respondent's husband to said 
corporation was to be retained by it, and 
the balance was to be accounted for to 
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respondent. The corporation, therefore, 
obtained the property for a special pur-
pose. The purpose was two fold: (1) To 
secure the debt due from the respondent's 
husband to it; and (2) to sell the property 
for that purpose, but for the best price 
obtainable, and to hold respondent's share 
of the funds in trust for her, and to ac-
count to her for the same. The obligation 
of the corporation, therefore, was in the 
nature of a trust, and its relation to re-
spondent and the fund was in the nature 
of a trustee, and we shall so treat it. The 
corporation in selling the property was 
bound to sell it for the 'best price that 
coU!ld be obtained' therefor. If the prop-
erty was sold for a less price, the corpora-
tion would still be liable to respondent 
for the difference between what the prop-
erty was actually sold for and what the 
corporation could have obtained for it.'' 
In the case of Van Alen vs. The American 
National Bank, 52 N. Y. 1, the New York Court 
of Appeals in its opinion says, at p. 4: 
"It appears to me clear that Van Alen 
& Rice were the agents of the plaintiff to 
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sell the bonds, and were bound to keep 
the proceeds of the same for him. He 
owned the bonds, directed their sale, and 
also directed that the proceeds should be 
kept for him in a particular manner, and 
he was notified by Van Alen & Rice that 
they had been sold and the avails placed 
and would be kept as directed. These un-
disputed facts establish the relation of 
trustee and cestui que trust between the 
plaintiff and Van Alen & Rice as to the 
proceeds of these bonds.'' 
It is no less certain that the undisputed facts in 
the case at bar constitute a trust. 
Similar situations are found m the case of 
State ex rel Sorensen vs. State Bank of Touhy, 
Neb. 240 N. W. 925, in which in the course of its 
opinion the Court says : 
"It is a stipulated fact that claimant 
instructed the officers in charge of the 
bank to remit the $4,305.78 to the agent 
of the Prudential Insurance Company at 
F.argo. Claimant used the check for the 
so1le purpose of paying his debt by bank 
Abe. Traae. 
33 
remittance. What the banker entered on 
the books and on the so-called 'deposit 
slip.' to the contrary was the work of the 
bank and did not record the consent of 
claimant to ,a deposit. If the amount of 
the check was a mere credit on the check-
ing account of claimant, the bank could 
not have used the funds for the remit-
tance directed by him without his person-
al check, which was never drawn. What 
was called a 'deposit slip' amounted to 
no more than receipt for the check deliv-
ered to the bank for the sole purpose of 
providing the means for the remittance 
ordered. The bank received the check as 
a trustee, converted the proceeds, used 
them for banking purposes, and is ac-
countable as trustee. The proceeds con-
stituted trust funds which belonged to 
claimant pending the execution of the 
trust - an unperformed duty of the 
trustee. The trust funds never became the 
property of the bank and are not assets 
distributable to depositors.'' 
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39 A. L. R. 930. 
"ln that case" (Northwest Lumber Co. 
v. Scandinavian-American Bank, 225 Pac. 
825) "it appeared that a corporation, 
having certain bonds outstanding, drew a 
check on its general deposit in a bank 
which was trustee for the bondholders, in 
favor of the hank, for the amount to be-
come due on the bonds, and sent it to the 
bank. Before it could be passed through 
the bookkeeping routine of the bank and 
marked 'Paid,' the bank was closed by 
the state authorities. It is held that, im-
mediately ·on the acceptance of the check 
by the bank, the amount represented 
thereby became a specific deposit for the 
·purpose of making the designated pay-
ments, and that the depositor had a prefer-
ential claim for that amount. The court 
holds that it is immaterial that the assets 
of the bank were not augmented by the 
transaction.'' 
''So, in Lusk Development & Improv. 
Co. v. Giinther (1925) Wyoming 232 Pac. 
518, the beneficiary was held to be en-
titled to a preference with regard to 
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money paid to a bank to obtain a deed 
held by it in escrow. The court held, 
further, that in such case the burden was 
on the claimant to identify the money to 
which a trust in his favor had attached, 
but that, in so doing, he was aided by the 
rule that if a trustee mingles trust funds 
with his own it is presumed that, in mak-
ing subsequent payments, he uses his own 
money, and not the trust fund. Applying 
this rule, it was said: 'In the case at bar 
only five days intervened between the 
time that the payment herein was made 
and the time that the bank closed. The 
presumption is, as stated before, that 
men act honestrly, and, carrying that pre-
sumption to its logical conclusion, and ap-
plying it reasonably, as may well be done 
in the case at bar, we should, we think, 
presume that the trustee in this case did 
not pay out the trust money, but re-
tained it, and that it passed into the hands 
of the receiver; hence, throwing the bur-
den to produce evidence to show the con-
trary on the latter'." 
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In the case of Littman v. Broderick, 250 N. 
Y. S. 546 a deposit was made at the Bank of 
United States for payment to a creditor in Ha-
vana, Cuba. The Bank issued the usual receipt 
for such mom•y. rph(• creditor in Cuba declined to 
aceept the money a11d the depositor sued for its 
return after thE' Bank of United States closed its 
doors. 1'he court held the. deposit a special de-
posit for a particular purposP and held that the 
Bank, having failed to carry out that purpose, was 
bound to retnrn the money. In the option in tnis 
case the court cites and quotes from the case of 
Cutler v. American Exchange National Bank, 113 
N.Y. 593: 
"In that case the plaintiffs deposited 
with the defendant bank at New York tl1e 
sum of $500 for payment to one Hall in 
Leadville, Colo., and received the bank's 
receipt therefor. The bank at Leadville 
went into the hands of a receiver before 
the transaction was concluded, and sought 
to evade liability, disclaiming that the de-
posit was a special deposit. The court, by 
Judge Gray, said: 'The deposit was a spe-
cial one for a designated beneficiary, and 
Abs. Trans. 
37 
could not be used or dedicated by the de-
fpndant to any other purpose. No system of 
bookkt>eping entries would be allowed to 
cause thP plain agreement of the parties to 
miscarry, ()ither with respect to a payment 
to Hall, or to its return to the depositors 
in the event of the failure of the defendant 
to cause such payment.' " 
'l'he Court in its opinion also states as follows: 
''In Libby v. Hopkins, 104 U. S. 303, 
3W, 26 L. Ed. 769, the court said: 'vVhen 
A. sends money to B., with directions to 
apply it to a debt due from him to B., it 
cannot be construed as a deposit, even 
though B. may be a banker. 'l'he reason is 
plain. The consent of A. that it shall be 
considered a deposit, and not a payment, is 
necessary and is wanting.' '' 
If this is true, as it undoubtedly is, then it neces-
sarily follows that the consent of J. R. Walker to 
become a general creditor of Walker Brothers Dry 
Goods Company and not to have his wife's future 




Reichert, State Banking Com'r v. Mid-
land County Savings Bank, 236 N. 
vv. 859 
"The question IS whether the deposit 
is a preferr·ed claim against the receiver. 
"The general rule, as stated in 31 A. L. 
R. 473, is: 'It may be stated as a general 
rule that where a deposit is made in a bank 
with the distinct understanding that it is 
to be held by the bank for the purpose of 
furthering a transaction between the de-
positor and a third person, or where it is 
made under such circumstances as give rise 
to a necessary implication that it is made 
for such a purpose, the deposit becomes 
impressed with a trust which entitles the 
depositor to a preference over the gener-
al creditors of the bank where it becomes 
insolvent while holding the deposits.' " 
''The parties to a special deposit in a 
bank ordinarily do not contemplate that 
the bank shall set aside specific currency 
to be held in its vault, but that it will col-
lect outside checks in the usual manner 
through correspondents upon whose books 
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they have credit. The practice here fol-
lowed was usual, showed no intention on the 
part of the bank to change its agreement 
and convert the deposit into a general one; 
nor, having received it in specific trust, 
could it lawfuUy have so converted it with-
out consent of the depositor. 
'' 'J1he writing of the certificates of de-
posits was for convenience in bookkeeping. 
'rhey were not issued as negotiable paper, 
as they were not delivered to the depositor. 
The fact that the bank informed Gallagher 
that the account was so handled did not evi-
dence an intention to modify the contem-
poraneous specific agreement that the de-
posit was in trust; nor did it have such 
legal effect.'' 
In the case of Hudspeth v. Union Trust & 
Savings Bank, 195 N. W. 378, 31 A. L. R. 466, it 
was held that money placed in a bank to be de-
livered to one who has contracted to ·outfit a cafe 
as soon as his c.ontract is complied with, is a trust 
fund. In its opinion the Court says: 
"Without restating the facts, it is quite 
clear that, by the original transaction, a 
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trust was ereated. Although the identical 
funds W(~re not kept separate, the transac-
tion itself was considered as an escro\V 
transaction, and so shown on the escrow 
register of the Bennett concern, which 
passed to its successors. 'l'he letter of in-
structions of April 26th passed from the 
Bennett Company to its successor and on 
to the receiver. Both banks had notice and 
knowledge of the character of the transae-
tion. In addition to this, it affirmatively ap-
pears that the fund has not been dissipat-
ed, but has come into the receiver's hands 
as a traceable account, or an augmentation 
of the whole estate. vVe do not understand 
appellee to contend, or the cases to hola, 
that it is necessary to identify the partieu-
lar funds. The evidence shows without dis-
pute that at all times both the Bennett 
Loan & Trust Company and its sueeessor 
had a sufficient amount on hand to pay this 
claim, and a sufficient amount went into 
the hands of the receiver to pay it. Under 
the recent case of Messenger v. Carroll 
Trust & Sav. Bank, 193 Iowa, 608, 187 N. 
W. 545, this was sufficient tracing of the 
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funds into the hands of the receiver, and 
the estate was augmented to the extent of 
the deposit.'' 
In the Hudspeth case, quoting from Jones v. 
Chesebrough, 105 Iowa, 303, 75 N. W. 97, it is fur-
ther said: 
" 'It appears that the money in ques-
tion was received by the Cadwells, and that 
their estate was increased by that amount. 
As they received it, knowing its trust char-
acter, it will be presumed, in the absence 
of a showing to the contrary, that it was 
preserved by them in some form, and that 
it passed into the hands ·of the assignee. It 
is not material for the purpose of this case 
whether the balance was preserved in the 
form of money or in other property. It is 
only necessary that it appear, by presump-
tion of law or otherwise, that it has been 
preserved in the hands of the defendant. 
The money having been traced to the estate 
of the Cadwells impressed with the charac-
ter of a trust fund, the burden was upon 
the defendant to show that it contributed 
nothing to the estate which he acquired by 
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virtue of the assignment, and that he has 
failed to do.' '' 
"The relation of a bank toward a de-
positor who places money with it for a 
special purpose of paying a note held by a 
third person is that of a trustee, and tne 
amount so deposited is a special deposit 
within the rule allowing the recovery of a 
special deposit as a preferred claim after 
the insolvency of the bank. Central Bank 
& T. Co. v. Ritchie (Wash.) supra." (120 
Wash. 160, 206 Pac. 926 [1922.]) 
''In Capitol N atl. Bank v. Coldwater 
Nat. Bank (1896) 49 Neb. 786, 59 Am. St. 
Rep. 572, 69 N. W. 115, writ of error dis-
missed in (1899) 172 U. S. 434, 43 L. Ed. 
505, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 873, it was said that 
a fund which comes into the possession of 
a bank, with respect to which the bank has 
but a single duty to perform, and that is, 
to deliver it to the person entitled thereto, 
is a trust fund, and is incapable of being 
commingled with the general assets of the 




"In People v. City Bank (N.Y.) supra" 
(96 N. Y. 32) (1884) "it was said with 
reference to cheeks deposited in a bank for 
the specific purpose of paying certain notes 
held by a third person: ''The checks were 
impressed with a trust, and no change of 
them into any other shape could devest it 
so as to give the bank or its receiver any 
different or more valid claim to them than 
the bank had before the conversion.' '' 
''Where the owner of a house damaged 
by fire took the check received from the in-
surance company to a bank, and stated that 
she wanted it collected and kept by the 
bank for the particular purpose of paying 
the contractor who was repairing her 
house, but refused to .allow it to be credited 
to her checking account, whereupon she 
was given a receipt bearing the words 'Sp. 
Dept.,' it was held that, on the insolvency 
of the bank, her claim should be treated as 
a trust fund, entitling her to a preference 
over the general creditors of the bank." 
"In Lamb v. Ladd (1922) 112 Kan. 26, 
209 Pac. 826, it was held that the owner 
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might recover as a trust fund a deposit 
made in a bank in an escrow account to be' 
paid to a third person on the fulfillment by 
him of a certain contract for drilling an 
oil well, or returned to the depositor on the 
failure of the third person to carry out his 
part of the contract, where it appeared that 
he had so failed, and the hank had com-
mingled the deposit with its general funds 
used in the general course of its banking 
business, and had subsequently become in-
solvent.'' 
"Where a purchaser of real estate de-
livered to a bank a sum of money to be 
paid over to the se1ler when he should pre-
sent to the bank a warranty deed, property 
executed, together with an abstract show-
ing good title, and took a receipt from the 
bank, reciting tne purpose for which the 
money was left with it, on the subsequent 
failure of the bank it was held that the 
fund was impressed with a trust, and coufd 
be recovered from the receiver in prefer-
ence to the general creditors of the bank. 
And the fact that the bank, without the 
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knowledge or consent of the purchaser, 
gave credit on its books to him as ·of a gen-
eral deposit, and mingled the money with 
its general funds, was held not to change 
the character of the transaction.'' (Kim-
mel v. Dickson (1894) 5 S. D. 221, 25 L. 
R. A. 309, 49 Am. St. Rep. 869, 58 N. Vv. 
561. 
''Where the cashier of a bank negoti-
ated a loan for a purchaser of real estate, 
and, by agreement between the vendor and 
purchaser, he was to collect the draft giv-
en for the loan and hold the same until the 
transaction was closed, and then turn the 
proceeds over to the vendor, it was held 
that the fundR were impressed with a trust 
in favor of the vendor, and so did not pass 
to the receiver of the bank on its insolven-
cy; and this was true despite the fact that 
a certificate of deposit was issued to the 
vendor for the amount, since such certifi-
cate, under the circumstances, amounted 
to no more than a receipt or acknowledg-
ment that the bank held the money for the 
vendor under the terms stipulated, and did 
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not make the vendor a general depositor. 
State ex rei. Ladenburger v. State Bank 
(1894) 42 Neb. 896, 61 N. \V. 252." 
Corporation Commission v. Merchants 
Bank & Trust, 138 S. E. 530, 57 A. 
L. R. 382 (North Carolina) 
Quoting from Morton v. Woolery, 189 
N. \V. 232) 
" '\Vhere money IS deposited for a 
special purpose, as, for instance, in this 
case, where it was deposited for the stated 
purpose of meeting certain checks to be 
thereafter drawn against such deposit, the 
deposit does not become a general one, but 
the bank, upon accepting the deposit, be-
comes bound by the conditions imposed, 
and, if it fails to apply the money at all, 
or misapplies it, it can be recovered as a 
trust deposit.' " 
The North Carolina court then says : 
"Brushing aside the cobwebs, m this 
action the $20,000 Page check was deposit-
ed upon the distinct agreement and under-
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standing that Angelo Bros. were to check 
out $12,950 to pay off the lien; in fact, the 
$20,000 check was part purchase price of 
lana that there was a lien for $12,950 on. 
"The $20,000 deposit was impressed 
with the trust to the extent of $12,950. The 
specific purpose was to pay out of it the 
$12,950. Under the facts and circumstances 
of this action, equity will hold the $12,950 
for the benefit of Angelo Bros. The check 
was held in trust by the bank for this speci-
fic purpose. The brulance, it would seem, un-
der the facts disclosed, was a general de-
posit. There is no question as to the bank 
collecting the check as it was marked 'paid' 
the very day of the deposit. In a eourt of 
equity, the general rule is 'Equality is 
equity,' but not so, as in this action, the 
check of $20,000 was impres-sed with a 
trust of $12,950. This amount has priority 
of payment out of 'the assets in the hands 
of said receiver.' As to the balance of the 
$20,000 deposit, Angelo Bros. is a creditor 
like any other unsecured creditor." 
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In the case of Blythe v. Kujawa (Minn.), 
220 N. W. 168, 60 A. L. R. 330, it appears 
that the plaintiff purchased a farm from 
the defendants Kujawa. It was agreed that 
$4,500, a note, and a mortgage on the prop-
erty should be left in escrow in the Nation-
al Farmers' Bank until title to the farm 
was perfected and approved and a deed 
given. This agreement was carried out 
through the agency of F. M. Blythe, a 
brother of the plaintiff. By direction of an 
officer of the bank, F. M. Blythe deposited 
the check in the bank to his own account. 
The banker then made out a check for the 
amount on the National Farmers' Barik, 
payable to John Kujawa, the vendor of tfie 
farm, and directed F. M. Blythe to sign it, 
which he did. The note, the mortgage, and 
the check to Kujawa were placed in an en-
velop by the banker, with directions on the 
envelop to deliv;er over the $4,500 to Ku-
jawa when the conditions with regard to 
the warranty of title had been complied 
with. The bank credited its assets with the 
check for $4,500 deposited to the account 
of F. M. Blythe. F. M. Blythe never drew 
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out any of the $4,500 so deposited. The 
bank failed and its assets passed into the 
hands of a receiver before the title to the 
land was perfected. On the tender of the 
waranty deed, the receiver refus,ed to re-
ceive the deed or recognize the escrow. The 
court holds that the $4,500 was a trust fund 
and special deposit held by the bank, and 
that the plaintiff was the owner and en-
titled to the $4,500 trust fund. 
And in Evans v. People's Bank, 6 S. vV. 
(2d) 655, where $4,000 was deposited in the 
defendant bank, with directions that the 
bank use this money to purchase certain 
government bonds, the court held that sue'h 
funds constituted a special trust fund, and 
entitled the plaintiff, on the bank's insol-
vency, to a preferred claim in the assets 
of the bank, saying: ''Plain tiff had a check-
ing account in the bank. She delivered to 
the cashier two checks on this account for 
$2,000 each, payable to bonds, and directed 
him to invest the proceeds of said checks 
in government bonds for her. The cashier 
charged these two checks to her account, 
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thus withdrawing $4,000 from said account. 
"\:Vhile it is true that the $4,000 may not 
have actually passed into the physical pos-
session of the cashier, yet the legal effect 
of charging thes,e checks against plaintiff's 
account, under the circumstances here 
shown, was to place $4,000 of plaintiff's 
money in the hands of the cashier, with 
special instructions from plaintiff to in-
vest it in government bonds for her. The 
cashier violated his instructions by invest-
ing the money in time certificates of de• 
posit in said bank, instead of investing it 
in government bonds, as he was directed to 
do. rrhe voluntary, wrongful, and unauthor-
ized act of the cashier in placing this mon-
ey on time deposit and issuing certificates 
of deposit therefor, without the knowledge 
or consent of plaintiff, could not have the 
effect of forcing her to accept a relation 
with said bank that she never intended to 
create, or change the relation that was ac~ 
tually created at the time plaintiff deliv-
ered the checks to the cashier and directed 
him to invest their proceeds in government 
bonds. Relationships are created by the 
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conduct or agreement of both parties, and 
not by the voluntary act of one party with-
out the knowledge or consent of the other. 
Ellington v. Cantley (1927) Mo. App. 300 
S. W. 529, 530; William R. Compton Co. 
v. :F'armers r.l,rust Co. (1925) 220 Mo. App. 
1081,279 S. \V. 746, 749. \Ve therefore hold 
that the unauthorized act of the cashier in 
investing plaintiff's money in time certifi-
cates of deposit did not create the relation 
·of debtor and creditor between plaintiff 
and the bank. A trust has been defined to 
be 'a holding of property, subject to a duty 
of employing it or applying its proceeds 
according to directions given by the person 
from whom it was derived.' 39 Cyc. 17. The 
supreme court of this state, in Corby v. 
Corby (1884) 85 Mo. 371, defines a trust 
as follows: 'A trust is a relation between 
two persons, by virtue of which one of 
them (the trustee) holds property for the 
benefit of the other (the cestui que trust).' 
The transaction had between plaintiff and 
the bank created a relation of trust, and not 
of debtor and creditor. When the bank ac-
cepted the money from plaintiff with speci-
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fie directions to invest it in govemment 
bonds, thE: titl<> thereto did not pass, but 
the bank tlwn~after held the money in trust 
for plaintiff, subject to the duty of invest-
ing it in government bonds as directed by 
plaintiff.'' 
Also in Greenfield v. Clarence Sav. 
Bank Mo., 5 S. \V. (2d) 708, it appeared 
that the plaintiff, George W. Greenfield, 
who had no account with the Clarence Sav-
ings Bank, went there for the sole purpose 
of purchasing bonds as an investment, and, 
on the suggestion of its president, he left 
$2,000 with the bank, with the distinct un-
derstanding that the bank was to purchase 
bonds of the Farm & Home Savings & 
Loan Association of Nevada, .Missouri, for 
him with this money. \Vhen George \Y. 
Greenfield made the deposit in the Clar-
ence Savings Bank, he was given a receipt 
as follows: "Clarence, Missouri, March 10, 
1925. Received of George \Y. Greenfield, 
Leonard, Missouri, two thousand and 
nojlOO doHars for the purchase of four 
five hundred dollar coupon bonds of the 
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Farm & Savings and Loan Association, Ne-
vada, :Missouri, $2,000. Clarenee Savings 
Hank, by M. H. Lewis, President,'' The 
Clarence Savings Bank later became insol-
vent. The court, in holding that the plaintiff 
was entitled to a preference, that the de-
posit made was a special deposit, said: 
''The trial court, in our view, properly held 
that it was the intention of plaintiff and the 
understanding of the bank that the money 
was accepted by tlie bank as a special de-
posit for the specific purpose of purchas-
ing bonds. The fact that, after the insol-
vency of the bank, M. H. Lewis, its pres-
ident, gave his personal note for $2,000 to 
plaintiff Greenfie1ld, as collateral security 
for the payment of the deposit, with 
the understanding that the note was to 
be returned to Lewis after Greenfield 
should receive his money from the fi-
nanee commissioner upon liquidation of 
the bank, cannot in any manner affect 
the plaintiff's right to follow and re-
cover the special deposit, where, as here, 
the right of no creditor of the bank has 




In Re Security Sav. Bank (Iowa), 217 N. 
vV. 831, it appeared that George J. Dugan 
was the attorney for the administrator 
with the will annexed of the estate of one 
·white, and was also a representative of the 
\V estern Surety Company. A loan to be 
made on the property of the vVhite estate 
was in contemplation, and, in the negotia-
tions therefor, it became necessary for the 
administrator of the White estate to fur-
nish a bond. The bond was furnished by the 
·western Surety Company and was ·exe-
cuted by Dugan as the representative of 
that company. In order to secure the pay-
ment of the premium on the bond, heirs of 
the ·white estate deposited the amount of 
the premium, $314.53, with the Security 
Savings Bank, for which a certificate of 
deposit or cashier's check was issued, and 
held by Dugan. Later, before the bank 
closed its doors, Dugan, through ·a repre-
sentative, demanded payment of the 
$314.53. The representative was induced 
by the officers of the bank to leave the 
amount in the bank on special deposit and 
to accept the following certificate: "Securi-
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ty Savings Bank, Perry, Iowa, Jan. 24, 
1925. No 5214. Geo. Dugan, trustee, has 
deposited in this bank three hundr,ed four-
teen and 5:3j100 dollars, $314.53, payable 
to the order of himself as trustee in cur-
rent funds on the return of this certificate 
properly indorsed. Special deposit as per 
notation on back. H. N. Graves, Cashier." 
On the back of the instrument appeared 
the following: "This amount of $:314.53' is 
a special deposit, and paid into this bank 
for the ,express purpose of paying the 
premium of a bond of Western Surety 
Company to Annis & Rohling in J olm 
\Vhite estate, and said funds are a special 
deposit for said purpose, and preferred 
claim for the above amount. Security Sav-
ings Bank) by N.H. Graves, Cashier." Lat-
er the bank became insolvent, and its as-
sets passed into the hand of a receiver. The 
court held that the appellant, Dugan, was 
entitled to a preference, since the fund con-
stituted a special deposit, and the bank 
held the money as trustee, and since the 
funds of the bank were thereby augmented 
and so had passed into the hands of the 
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receiver. In so holding, the court said: "It 
is also well settled that a special deposit, or 
a deposit for a specific purpose, creates a 
trust relation as between the depositor and 
the bank, which will entitle him to a prefer-
ence. Officer v. Officer (1903) 120 Iowa, 
389, 98 Am. St. Rep. 365, 94 N. W. 947; 
Hudspeth v. Union Trust & Sav. Bank 
( 1923) 196 Iowa, 706, 195 N. \V. 378, 31 
A. L. R. 466, and cases cited in note in the 
latter publication. See also 7 C. J. 631, 751. 
Here the character ·of the deposit as spe-
cial was recognized, the purpose for which 
the money was to be used was designated, 
and the right of the depositor to a prefer-
ence was secured by the express terms ·of 
the certificate issued by the bank, the writ-
ten contract between the parties. The basic 
fact upon which a preference must be pre-
dicated, the existence of a relation of trust 
between the bank and the claimant, could 
not be more definitely and certainly estab-
lished.'' 
The foregoing authorities and the rules enun-
ciated therein establish beyond a doubt the 
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creation and existence of a trust in the case at 
bar. 
In answer to the further contentions of ap-
pellant we cite the following cases. They not only 
further tend to establish the existence of a trust 
but likewise lay down the rule that a definitB pre-
sumption exists in case of a trust followed oy 
insolvency, that the insolvent has used its own 
funds first, and that what remains and passes to 
the receiver contains either the trust funds or the 
proceeds therefrom. In case of money the rule 
simply requires sufficient moneys to come into 
the hands of the receiver to meet the requirements 
of the trust. Respondent endeavors to establish the 
further rule that the burden of proof resting up-
on the plaintiff is sustained upon proving the ex-
istence of the trust, and that the trust fund aug-
mented the assets of the insolvent coming into the 
hands of the receiver; that upon the establish-
ment of such a prima facie ease the burden of 
proof shifts to the defendant; that this presump-
tion can only be overcome by evidence to the con-
trary; and furthermore, that this presumption is 
very greatly strengthened when there is but a 
short time intervening between the deposit of the 
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trust funds, that is to say, the creation of a trust, 
and the appointment of a receiver. In the case at 
bar but thirty days intervened. When the receiver 
was appointed at the end of the thirty day period 
more than enough cash passed in to the hands of 
the receiver to meet the preferred claim of the 
respondent, and additional assets sufficient to pay 
general creditors approximately fifty five per cent. 
Rather than to discuss these questions further in 
our own language, we have quoted rather liberal-
ly from the cases which we cite and rely upon. We 
feel justified in so doing because of the importance 
to the respondent of establishing his preference. 
\V e have endeavored to confine ourselves to the 
citation and discussion of leading cases only. This 
Court has heretofore seriously considered these 
questions in the case of Tooele County Board of 
Education v. Hadlock. Respondent contends that 
the opinion in this case should control in the case 
at bar. Except for the contrary position taken 
by appellant in its brief many of the cases cited 
would have been unnecessary. We pass, then, to 
a review of these cases. 
In the case of Tooele County Board of Edu-




''An essential requirement of the law 
as to which there is no dispute between 
counsel for the parties is that, in order 
for funds in a bank or otherwise to be 
impressed with a trust, they must have in-
creased or augmented the assets of the 
trustee coming into the hands of the re-
ceiver." 
The County Treasurer in this case issued a check 
on the funds in the bank for $120,000.00 in favor 
of the Board of Education. It was argued that 
this did not augment the funds of the bank; that 
it was a mere bookkeeping transaction. The 
Court says: 
''No case has been called to our atten-
tion, and none has been found by us hold-
ing that under circumstances such as these 
a deposit made in a bank by means of a 
check drawn on that bank wi11 not be im-
pressed with a trust where it would have 
been ·SO impressed had the check been 
drawn on another bank. It is undisputed 
that there was in the bank more money 




it was presented to the bank on December 
24, 1930.'' 
Again, in the case at bar, the same contention 
is made that by the transfer of the account of 
Alice Young Frye to J. R. Walker the assets of 
Walker Brothers Dry Goods Company were not 
augmented. The analogy between the situation 
here and in the Tooele case is identical. It is 
undisputed that Walker Brothers Dry Goods 
Company had sufficient funds with which to pay 
off the entire account assigned to J. R. \V" alker. 
Mrs. Chase says, 
''A. At this time Mr. ·walker asked me to 
transfer the account of Alice Young Frye 
from her savings account to pay the ac-
count of Mrs. J. R. Walker and it left a 
balance of two thousand dollars, some-
where around that. He said Mrs. vValker 
would be charging more merchandise and 
we would use that to pay the account, use 
this two thousand to pay the account when 
her account was that amount.'' 
and Mr. Walker testified: 
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" I could have drawn it out if I wanted 
to.'' 
The situation, therefore, is identical with the 
Tooele situation. This court in its opinion fur-
ther says, page 323: 
''The transaction was one equivalent to 
the board demanding and receiving its 
money and thereafter placing it on de-
posit in the bank to its credit. Had this 
been done, there would have been no dif-
ference in the status of the deposit from 
that of the $66,448.86 which the court 
found to have been impressed with a 
trust. The authorities sustain the view 
that this is an augmentation of the funds 
and is sufficient to satisfy the require-
ments of the law in that respect." 
Likewise, Mr. vValker could have withdrawn the 
money, for his testimony stands uncontradicted, 
and he could then have redelivered it to \Valker 
Brothers Dry Goods Company for the special 
purpose of paying his wife's account. No other 
conclusion can be reached, therefore, than that 
the cash on hand of Walker Brothers Dry Goods 
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Company was augmented by the $2,909.85. The 
quotations contained in the Court's opinion from 
the cases of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Han-
over State Bank, 109 Kan. 772, 204 Pac. 992, and 
Northwest Lumber Co. v. Scandinavian Amer-
ican Bank of Seattle, 130 ~Wash. 33, 225 Pac. 825, 
are peculiarly in point. 
We have heretofore suggested in this brief 
that appellant is entitled to the benefit of the 
presumption that what remains at the time of 
insolvency is a trust fund. The Court says at 
page 325: 
"The same rule as to identifying or 
tracing the funds applies to public as to 
private funds. The money must be iden-
tified or traced into some other specific 
fund or property. There is a presumption, 
however, that what remains at the time of 
insolvency is a trust fund. The law pre-
sumes that trust funds were not approp-
riated and that a balance of cash in the 




While in the Tooele case this presumption was 
in part at least rebutted by evidence offered for 
that purpose, in the case at bar the presumption 
stands. No pleadings attack it. No evidence was 
offered to rebut it. The defendant admitted par-
·agraphs eight and eleven ·Of plaintiff's complaint, 
thereby in effect admitting that the receiver re-
ceived sums of money in excess of the amount of 
plaintiff's preferred claim upon his appointment 
as receiver, and that the assets which came into 
his hands were sufficient to pay approximately 
fifty-five per cent. of the amount of the claims 
of general creditors. As a result thereof, re-
spondent is entitled to the full force and effect 
of the presumption, and if, therefore, the re-
spondent is correct in his contention that this 
fund is a trust fund, he is entitled to be paid in 
full as a preferred creditor. This Court goes 
on to say in the Tooele case: 
"The :law has been fairly stated in the 
Wyoming case of Lask Development & 
Improvement Co. v. Giinther, 32 Wyo. 
232 P. 518, 520." 
This Court then quotes from the Wyoming case: 
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" 'Starting out, then, with this es-
tablished principle, that money in the 
case at bar must be traced and identified 
in some specific fund or property in the 
hands of the receiver-not, however, the 
identical money paid in-the question re-
mains, whether, indulging in all proper 
presumptions, that has been done in this 
case. The burden of proof to do so is on 
the cestui que trust. 39 Cyc. 532. But, 
when certain facts are shown, a presump-
tion may aid him and the burden to pro-
duce further evidence may shift to the 
opponent. First Nat. Bank v. Ford, 30 
i 
Wyo. 110, 216 P. 691. The presumption 
is that men act honestly; that when a 
trustee mingles trust money with his 
own, and then draws out sums from a 
common fund by check or otherwise, it 
will be presumed that he drew out his 
own in preference to the trust money'." 
citing cases including Waddell v. Waddell, 36 
Utah 435, 104 Pac. 743, and continues: 
''This principle has frequently been 
applied to cases where an insolvent, at 
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the time of the insolvency, had a certain 
balance of money on hand which went 
into the hands of the receiver, and in 
such case it has frequently been presumed 
that such balance included the trust 
money.'' 
It is said in the case of Sherwood v. Central 
Michigan Savings Bank, 103 Mich. 109, 61 N. W. 
352: 
''The courts are not overtechnical or 
zealous in seeking an opportlmity to say 
that the trust fund or property cannot be 
traced or that it has disappeared alto-
gether from the fund in which it or its 
proceeds have been comingled where there 
is evidence from which the contrary may 
legitimately be inferred.'' 
In the case of Yellowstone Company vs. 
First Trust & Savings Bank, 46 Mont. 439, 128 
Pac. 596, it is held that where trust funds are 
mingled with funds of the Bank the entire mixed 
fund is subject to the trust except to the extent 
that the Bank is able to distinguish and separate 
its own from the trust fund, and in such cases 
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the burden is on the Bank or its receiver to show 
that the commingled fund or that \Vhich remams 
therein is not subject to the trust. 
In the case of Thompson vs. the Bank of 
Syracuse, 278 S. vV. 810 and in Evans v. French, 
6 S. vV. (2d) 655, although the Missouri Court 
held that it was encumbent upon the beneficial 
owner of a trust fund to trace or fo>llow the 
same into the hands of the receiver, nevertheless 
it held that the showing that the trust fund was 
commingled by the Bank with its general assets 
and that assets came into the hands of the re-
ceiver sufficient to cover the trust fund is suffi-
cient without a more particular tracing of the 
trust fund to subject the entire assets m the 
hands of the receiver to the satisfaction of the 
trust. 
Townsend v. Athelstan Bank 
Dye v. Hook, 237 N. ,V. 356. 
"Manifestly, the intervener deposited 
the proceeds of his sale of catNe for the 
special purpose of meeting the Hess 
check; or, stating it another way, the in-
tervener made the deposit for the special 
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purpose of drawing a check m favor of 
Hess against it.'' 
'' 'When cash remains m the fai,ling 
concern at the time it discontinued bank-
ing ·operations and such money :was after-
wards delivered to the receiver, * * * 
the presumption is that said commingled 
fund contains 'the trust proceeds,' and 
the latter can be removed from the :whole 
:without injury or injustice to the general 
creditors because there :was 'augmenta-
tion.' Charity assumes that the trustee 
did no wrong, but spent and disposed of 
his own property and retained that which 
belonged to others'." 
From a note in 82 A. L. R. at 141 we take 
the following: 
''As we have seen, the commingling of 
a trust fund with the funds of the trustee 
bank does not extinguish the trust nor de-
feat the right of the beneficial owner to 
follow his fund into the hands of the 
bank's receiver, since the identity of the 
specific money representing the trust fund 
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IS immaterial. See subd. XI. a, b, supra. 
It is settled by the overwhelming weight 
of modern authority that where the bank 
commingles trust funds with funds of thP-
bank, all withdrawals and disbursements 
by the bank for its own purposes out of 
the mixed fund are presumed to be of the 
bank's own portion of such fund, ratl:er 
than of the trust funds, so long as the bal-
ance of the common fund remains in ex-
cess .of or equal to the amount of the trust 
funds, since it is presumed that the trus-
tee acted rightfully and left the trust 
funds intact, rather than that he violated 
the trust, and any balance remaining in 
the common fund and passing into the 
hands of the receiver is presumed to in-
clude or to be a part of the trust funds 
and is subject to the trust.'' 
At page 1-67 of the same note the author has the 
following to say: 
"The Court in Carlson v. Kies (1913) 
75 Wash. 171, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 317, 
134 Pac. 808, having stated the doctrine 
as a rule of substantive law, expressed 
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its doubt as to the desirability of treating 
it as a mere presumption. 
"It will be noted that the case of 
Knatchbull v. Hallett (1879) 13 Ch. Div. 
(Eng.) 696----'C. A., does not lay down the 
rule that this presumption is rebuttable 
by evidence of facts or circumstances 
showing that the trust money has in fact 
been withdrawn from the common fund, 
where the balance of the fund exceeds the 
amount of the trust money. On the contrary 
as will be noted, the language of J essel, M. 
R. is that where one can rightfully per-
form an act, 'he cannot say'-'he is not 
allowed to say'-that the act was in fact 
done wrongfully, and that, applying this 
principle to the case of a trustee who has 
blended trust moneys with his own, 'he 
cannot be heard to say' that the trust 
money was used and his own funds left 
intact. And the principle is thus stated 
in the dissenting opinion of Thesiger, L. 
J., who, wMle indicating his approval of 
the doctrine of a majority of the courts, 
as a matter of principle, felt constrained 
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by the authority of earlier cases to give 
effect to the rule of Clayton's case (1816) 
1 Meriv. 572, 35 Eng. Reprint, 781, 3 Eng. 
Rul. Cas. 329: 'The presumption of a man's 
innocence of crime may reasonably be set 
off against the presumption that he intend-
ed such an appropriation of payments upon 
his banking account as could only exist if 
he intended to commit a crime; and to the 
argument adduced by Mr. Hallet's repre-
sentatives in the present case, that the 
facts proved indicate that he did in fact in-
tend to misappropriate, and had misap-
propriated, the trust property, the am;wer 
might be given, as it might have been give11 
to Mr. Hallett himself if he had been alive 
to use the argument, 'allegan:;; suam tur-
pitudinem non est audiendus.' This lan-
guage would seem to indicate that the 
principle supporting the modern doctrim~ 
is not merely a logical presumption that 
the trustee will act rightfully rather than 
wrongfully, which may be rebutted by di-
rect evidence to the contrary, but is a rule 
of substantive law, analogous to the doc-
trine of eS'toppel, by which the trustee 
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and those claiming under him are abso-
lutely precluded from saying that the 
trustee used the trust money rather than 
his own, or from taking advantage of the 
trustee's own wrongful a0ts.'' 
From page 204 of the same note we copy the 
following: 
"Where it is shown that the trust fund 
has been mingled by the bank with its own 
funds, it has been held that the burden 
shifts to the bank's receiver or assignee 
to distinguish between the bank's own 
property and that of the cestui que trust. 
Smith v. Mottley (1906; C. C. A. 6th) 80 
C. C. A. 154, 150 Fed. 266, 17 Am. Bankr. 
Rep. 863. The whole fund may be held 
subject to the trust until an equitable sep-
aration of the trust money may be made. 
First Nat. Bank v. Williams (1926; D. C.) 
15 F. (2d) 585. The fund resulting from 
the commingling is impressed vvith a trust 
to the amount of the trust money mingled 
therein.'' 
In the case of Eastman vs. Farmers' State 
Bank of Olivia (Minn.), 221·N. vV. 236, it is said: 
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''The burden of proof goes no farther 
than to require plaintiffs to show that the 
money actually came into the hands of the 
bank. That such was the fact is conceded. 
Had there been on hand the day that 
Veigel as superintendent took charge of 
the bank an amount in cash equal to or 
greater than the balance of the trust 
funds in question, 1plaintiffs would have 
been entitled to full payment as a pre-
ferred creditor. This proposition is sup-
ported by numerous authorities and is 
conceded. '' 
In Woodhouse v. Crandall, 64 N. E. 292, a 
question arose as to whether $1,500.00 deposited 
with the Bank to secure the performance of a 
certain lease constituted a trust fund. The court 
says: 
''This deposit was for a specific pur-
pose, for the benefit and security of a 
third person (Charles F. ·woodhouse), 
and it created a trust relation in his 
favor. The banking firm assumed the pos-
ition of a trustee, and the money deposit-
ed constituted a trust fund, which the 
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bank was bound to keep intact for the 
purpose of the trust. The obligation of 
the bank was to preserve the sum of $1,-
500 as a trust fund for the person men-
tioned in the receipt, and to apply it to 
the purposes therein specified, and the 
title to such trust fund did not pass to 
the bank as a part of the general funds 
of the firm. '' 
The court not only found a trust to exist but 
further stated at page 294: 
''The presumption in such a case is 
that the money drawn out by the depos-
itor is his own, even if the trust money 
and his own are in one account, rather 
than that he had disregarded his trust 
,and violated his duty. The supreme court 
of the United States, ,approving of that 
decision, held in Central Nat. Bank of 
Baltimore v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. 
Co. 104 U. S. 54, 26 L. Ed. 693, that ,although 
the relation between a bank and its de-
positor is that merely of debtor and cred-
itor, and the balance of account i,s only a 
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debt, if the money is held by the depositor 
in a fiduciary capacity its character is not 
changed by being placed to his credit 
with his own money in his bank account. 
Money having been placed in the vaults 
of the bank, the law presumes that the 
trustees drew out their own money first, 
and that what remained belonged to the 
trust. "\V"hen the firm failed, there was re-
maining in the vault where this money 
was put $1,152.66 in cash, which the re-
ceiver obtained, and the legal presumption 
is that this belonged to the trust fund.'' 
In the case of Carlson v. Kies (Wash.), 134 
Pac. 808, a special deposit of some $3,000.00 was 
made a few days before the Bank closed its 
doors, to be held until certain receipts were re-
ceived. The court in this case says: 
''On the other hand, when a bank ac-
cepts a special deposit it becomes a trus-
tee of the depositor and holds the money 
subject to the trust. The receipt itself af-
fords strong, if not conclusive, evidence of' 
a special deposit. It shows that the money 
was placed in the bank for a special pur-
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pose. Fortified by the evidence of the de-
positor and the admitted circumstances 
here present, it is obvious that both par-
ties to the transaction intended to make 
a special and not a general deposit. It 
follows, therefore, that the bank holds the 
money, not as a general debtor, but in a 
fiduciary capacity.'' 
And again: 
"The doctrine of the modern authori-
ties and what we consider the sounder 
view is that the trust fund is recoverable 
where an equal amount in cash remained 
continuously in the bank until its suspen-
sion and passed to the receiver.'' 
And again: 
"In Fogg v. Tyler it was held that, 
where a sum of money in excess of the 
amount of a specia1l deposit was m the 
hands of the trustee bank when it became 
insolvent, the trust will be enforced not-
withstanding the fact that the identical 
money cannot be identified. It was said 
that it suffices if it can be traced into the 
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hands of the trustee 'either in its original 
or its altered state.' The Shopert case 
voices a like rule. There the court also 
said that receivers take the property of 
the insolvent subject to all legal and 
equitable claims, and that, when a fund 
consists of money, 'identification does not 
require that the identical bills or coins be 
discovered, but the ascertainment of the 
fund into which it has entered and lodged 
is sufficient'." 
This presumption that the trust funds are 
included in the moneys on hand at the time the 
receiver takes charge is strengthened when the 
time intervening between the deposit and the 
failure is relatively short. In this case Walker 
made the deposit in May; the receiver was ap-
pointed in June. In the annotation in 82 A. L. R. 
at page 93 we find the following: 
''The fact that only a short time 
elapsed between the receipt of the trust 
fund by the bank and the final closing of 
the bank because of insolvency logically 
reduces the probability that the fund has 
been paid out or dissipated by the bank. 
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Indeed, this interval may be so short as 
to reduce almost to zero the probabi>lity 
that the fund was lost before the closing 
of the bank. And the courts sometimes 
give much weight, if not controlling ef-
fect, to the shortness of this intervening 
period.'' 
This statement IS amply borne out by the Su-
preme Court of Wyoming in the ease of Lusk 
Improvement Company vs. Giinther, 32 Wyo. 
294, 232 Pae. 518, cited with approval by this 
Court in the Tooele hank ease. See also Carlson 
v. Kies (Wash.), 134 Pac. 808 and Secrest v. 
Ladd (Kan.), 209 Pae. 824, in which latter ease 
60 days elapsed. The same rule was nevertheless 
applied. 
Fully one-half of appellant's brief is devoted 
to a discussion of the account of Alice Frye prior 
to its assignment to the respondent. According 
to the evidence as detailed in appelant 's brief, Mr. 
Walker held and accumulated a fund in trust for 
Alice Frye and this fact was known to Mrs. Chase, 
the control accountant. The funds, therefore, came 
into the hands of Walker Brothers Dry Goods 
Company with knowledge on its part of the trust 
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relationship existing between the respondent and 
Alice Frye. On page 12 of appellant's brief ap-
pellant quotes from the testimony of Mr. "\Valker 
in which Mr. "\Valker says, "I put it in there," 
(speaking of Mrs. Frye's deposit) "I was trus-
tee.'' There can be no question, therefore, that 
whatever moneys \Valker Brothers Dry Goods 
Company took of Alice Frye the same was im-
pressed with the trust existing between the re-
spondent and Alice Frye. \V" alker Bros. Dry Goods 
Co., or the appellant standing in its shoes, could 
not claim to stand in the position of a bona fide 
purchaser without notice. ~Whether Alice Frye was 
a simple contract creditor, as claimed by appel-
lant, or not ceases to be of controlling importance 
upon the transfer of the deposit to the respondent 
and the definite chang(~ made by the respondent in 
the nature of said deposit at the time of said 
transfer. On page 7 of appellant's brief appellant 
states that in May, 1930, and while respondent was 
president and director of the Company, he made 
settlement with Alice "B-,rye and she assigned her 
claim against the company arising out of the de-
posit of funds, to the respondent. The credit bal-
ance in favor of Alice Frye at this time approxi-
mated the sum of $5,909.85. In emphasizing the 
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fact that respondent was president and director 
of the company at this time, that is, May, 1930, 
and ordered the control accountant to do as he 
said, appellant overlooks the fact that on page 
two of its own brief it has emphasized the fact 
that -walker at that particular time was only a 
figurehPad. He was not ordering any one at that 
time. Quoting from appellant's brief: 
"From 1903 to November, 1928'' 
(speaking of respondent) "he was the ac-
tive head of the business, but after that 
date Dreyfous completely ordered its des-
tinies and the plaintiff Walker was only 
a figurehead.'' 
\V alker entered into a new agreement with the 
Company at that time. The Company acte<! 
through Mrs. Chase, its control accountant, who 
was in turn under Mr. Dreyfous, the general man-
ager and actual head of the Company. After the 
transfer of the Frye account to respondent th8re 
waS' no agreement on the part of the Company to 
pay interest upon the $2,909.85 or to hold the same 
as an account payable to an employee or as 
an employee's savings account. Whatever may 
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have been the nature of the deposit in fa-
vor of Mrs. Frye, after the transfer to Mr. 
Walker a new and entirely different relation-
ship came into existence. There was a def-
inite novation. In place of an account upon which 
the company paid interest, the company, in legal 
effect, paid the total amount of the deposit of Mrs. 
Frye to the respondent and the respondent in turn 
applied $3,000.00 thereof to the payment of his 
wife's present indebtedness and deposited with 
the Company under an entirely new, separate and 
distinct arrangement the balance of $2,909.85, to 
be held by the Company for the specific and sore 
purpose of paying for his wife's future purchases. 
It is with this transaction that we are concerned 
upon this appeal. \i\T e can rely with implicit con-
fidence upon the deeision of this Court in the case 
of Tooele County Board of Education v. Hadlock, 
11 Pac. (2d) in which the Court says: 
''The transaction was one equivalent to 
the board demanding and receiving its 
money and thereafter placing it on deposit 
in the bank to its credit." 
On this particular point appellant relies large-
ly on the case of Blakey v. Brinson, 286 U. S. 
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254, 76 L. Ed. 1089. An important detail distin-
guishes this case from the case at bar. We have 
involved in the Blakey case a trust ex maleficio. 
In the annotation in 82 A. L. R. at page 159 tlie 
cases are cited dealing with trusts ex maleficio. In 
the case of People v. California .Safe Deposit & 
T. Co. 175 Cal. 75,6, 167 Pac. 388, the question is 
asked," Can the wrongful act of the party obtain-
ing the money furnish the basis for making him a 
trustee, and at the same time the ground for pre-
suming that he acts rightfully~" And the Court 
disposed of this question in the negative. Numer-
ous other cases are cited in which it is held that 
the presumption in favor of the trust funds upon 
commingling thereof does not exist in cases of 
trusts ex maleficio. Furthermore, in the Blakey 
case there is no third person such as we have in 
the case at bar. Had the savings account in the 
Blakey case been closed and had the bank agreeu 
to hold the amount thereof for the sole purpose 
of paying a definite obligation of a third person 
thereafter to become due, we would have a situa-
tion similar to the case at bar. As the case stands, 
we do not. We wish at this point to emphasize the 
fact that the Court in this opinion says: 
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"It would have been equally compet-
ent for respondent to have provided for the 
purchase of the bonds by the creation of a 
trust of funds in the hands of the bank to 
be used for that purpose." 
Inasmuch as the Court found from the evidence 
that he had not done this the case is clearly and 
definitely distinguish from the ease at bar. The 
evidence in the ease at bar of both Mr. Walker 
and of Mrs. Chase stands uncontradicted that such 
a trust was created. Counsel in his brief attempts 
to distinguish the Tooele County case from the 
case at bar. In making this comparison ap-
pellant assumes there was no change in the status 
of this account npon the transfer thereof to Mr. 
"'\\Talker and thereafter the agreement upon the 
part of Walker Brothers Dry Goods Company to 
hold the balance to pay it for the indebtedness of 
l\lrs. \Valker. Inasmuch as this assumption is con-
trary to the law, as herein cited, the purpose of 
the attempted comparison must fail. Appellant has 
likewise overlooked the fact that Walker Brothers 
Dry Goods Company took Mrs. :B..,rye 's money from 
the respondent knowing it was held by respondent 
in trust for Mrs. Frye and, therefore, impressed 
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with the same trust in their hands. We believe, by 
the authorities which we have heretofore cited, 
that we have amply substantiated our position that 
the assets of Walker Brothers Dry Goods Com-
pany were augmented in May of 1930 by J. R. 
Walker leaving with the Company the sum of $2,-
909.85 for the payment of his wife's future ac-
count. \:V e contend likewise that we have estab-
lished by the authorities cited the existence of a 
presumption in favor of respondent. The moneys 
which came into the hands of the receiver, being 
greater in amount than respondent's claim, includ-
ed the trust fund to which respondent is entitled. 
Had this not been the case, after our establishing 
our prima facie case, the burden of proof shifted 
to the appellant to prove the contrary. The facts 
and the figures and all of the information were 
peculiarly within the knowledge of the appe1lant. 
The appellant nevertheless offered no proof what-
soever to rebut said presumption and, therefore, 
upon this appeal should not be heard to say that 
respondent has failed to trace the proceeds of the 
trust into the hands of the receiver. 
The third proposition dwelt on atgreat length 
by appellant in its brief, commencing at page 34, 
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has likewise been fully answered by the authori-
ties herein cited. Appellant would go hack and in-
sist upon respondent tracing the funds of respond-
ent's assignor. This, of course, becomes unneces-
sary under respondent's theory of the case. There 
were funds ou hand with whieh to pay the full 
amount of .Mrs . .B~rye's account in May of 1930, 
when the same was transferred to J. R. ·walker. 
He in effect gave to the company $2,909.85 at that 
time, within a month of the appointment of a re-
ceiver. The receiver received more than the 
amount of respondent's preferred claim in cash 
and enough other assets to pay general creditors 
approximately fifty -five per cent. We have clearly 
established facts sufficient to establish a prima 
facie case, upon which the presumption is predi-
cated. \Vhat happened prior to May of 1930 is im-
material. 
On page 31 and on page 34 of appellant's 
brief appear statements in bold, heavy type. Eacn 
of these statements might be material and impor-
tant, as respondent has indicated heretofore, had 
this action been brought by Mrs. Frye in her own 
right prior to any assignment or change in the 
condition of the account. The first statement on 
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page 31 complains because each of the original 
deposits of Mrs. Frye have not been traced speci-
fically into the hands of the receiver, and the sec-
ond statement, on page 34, complains of the fact 
that these original deposits of Mrs. ]~rye were 
intermingled with the funds of the corporation 
used in the business of the corporation and have 
not been traced into the hands of the receiver. The 
entire balance of appellant's brief is largely de-
voted to a discussion of cases which might have 
some application or bearing in a suit instituted 
by Mrs. Frye, but no bearing in the instant case, 
subsequent to the assignment of the account to 
\Valker and the new agreement made by Walker 
with the corporation. In this latter half ·Of plain-
tiff's brief the evidence concerning bank accounts 
and time deposits, the custom of Walker Brothers 
Dry Goods Company prior to Mr. Dreyfous' re-
gime, are discussed at great ~ength, as though they 
had some bearing upon the case at bar. Their 
importance was terminated upon the assignment 
to respondent after Mr. Dreyfous had entirely 
changed the old, established methods and customs 
of the firm and had accepted said assign-
ment. The Frye account was paid in full and 
ceased to exist for all purposes. In lieu thereof a 
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new obligation sprang up, in which the company, 
under Mr. Dreyfous' management, accepted and 
agreed to hold in trust for the use and benefit of 
a third person, to-wit: Mrs. ·walker, the sum of 
$2,909.85. It is in the light of the conditions as they 
existed at the time the receiver was appointed that 
a correct decision of this case can be found, not 
in the condition of affairs prior to the creation 
and existence of the rights of repondent soug·ht 
to be enforced in this action. It would be as us~ 
less, therefore, to discuss the cases cited in the 
latter portion of appellant's brief as it would be 
to prolong a discussion of the evidence therein set 
forth at considerable length. 
In conclusion, it is submitted that a trust re-
lationship was entered into by the respondent and 
Walker Brothers in May of 1930, as a result of 
which the respondent is entitled to receive as a 
preferred creditor the sum awarded him by the 
lower court, and is entitled to an affirmance of 
the judgment of the lower court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HENRY D. MOYLE, 
Attorney for Respondent. 
